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Cutting Scotland Loose: A Southern Briton’s response to Preston. 
 
Peter Preston has written a stimulating and provocative essay (Preston, 2008) on the 
subject of Scottish independence.   It deserves a response from a southern Briton, 
although I do not ‘scoff’ at the prospect of independence, nor would I qualify as a 
member of a metropolitan elite.  (Preston, 2008, 718).1   My only qualifications for 
making this contribution are the fact that early in my career I treated emergent 
Scottish and Welsh nationalism as a serious political phenomenon that deserved 
systematic attention.  (Grant and Preece, 1968; Grant, 1970). 
       There is much in the article that I agree with.   For example, it is evidently the 
case that the continuing existence of a distinctive civil society in Scotland in the form 
of distinct systems of law, religion, education, local government and, last but not 
least, football facilitated the emergence of a distinctive Scottish political identity and 
a Scottish political class that fostered, and had an interest, in that identity.   The length 
of Scottish history has perhaps not been matched by the coherence of the nationalist 
trajectory, even though it seems to have escaped from some of the sentimental 
varieties of what amounted to ‘being Scottish’, albeit often initiated and perpetuated 
by persons from England.  Modern Scottish Nationalism may be defined as 
predominantly broadly social democratic, celebrating values of solidarity and 
community.   Whilst it may not be ‘atavistic’ as Preston argues, nationalism always 
depends in part on a definition of ‘the other’, in this case England and the English.   
That is why so many people – or, at least, liberal cosmopolitans - find nationalism, 
even its post-modern 21st century form, a phenomenon that makes them 
uncomfortable.    
                                                 
1 The term ‘southern Briton’ is presumably a play on the term ‘North Britain’ which was used by 
fervent unionists to describe Scotland. 
       I would also agree that elite-sponsored attempts to construct ‘a reaffirmation of 
Britain and Britishness’ (Pearson, 2008, 723) are artificial and unlikely to succeed.   It 
should be noted, nevertheless, that there has generally been a clear majority against 
the option of Scottish independence, with the latest polls consistent with the usually 
reported level of between a quarter and a third in favour and some 50 per cent 
against.2    It is possible to envisage a scenario in which a combination of recession 
and a Conservative government in London would change those numbers, but greater 
devolution seems a more likely future. 
        The greatest deficiency of the article is its assumption of a given future, 
particularly a European future which is central to the vision for Scotland that is 
presented.    Forecasting the future is fraught with danger, as a statement in the article 
shows: ‘The European Union is home to a number of small states: Ireland, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland comprise a north-west arc of small, prosperous member states: 
additionally, there are Iceland and Norway.’    (Preston, 2008, 723).    This vision of 
an arc of prosperity is looking less promising after the recent financial crisis, 
particularly in the cases of Iceland and Ireland. 
      The most suitable predictive exercise that can be undertaken in relation to the 
European Union (EU) is to distinguish a variety of possible scenarios (Gamble 2006) 
which can include disintegration and ‘business as usual’ as well as further integration.  
It is not necessarily the case that ‘the resolution of Europe’s general crisis has been 
ordered around the project of the European Union.’  (Preston, 2008, 721).   This 
project has often seemed to be ill defined, elitist, technocratic, complex and hence 
inaccessible to citizens and lacking in popular legitimacy.   During the recent financial 
crisis, the European Commission has been somewhat sidelined as heads of 
                                                 
2 See ‘Banks crisis proves setback for independence push’, Financial Times, 1 November 2008. 
government of the major member states have taken the initiative, while key EU 
policies such as those on state aids have risked being set aside in the pursuit of the 
defence of short-term member state interests.   The extent to which ‘The European 
political space offers the prospect of a reanimation of the imagined Scottish 
community, its clearer articulation’ (Preston, 2008, 721) is contingent on events at a 
European level which need not follow one clearly distinguishable and predetermined 
path.  The EU does lend itself to multi-level governance, but also to a variety of 
different forms of government – unitary, federal and partially devolved – among its 
member states. 
      Preston characterises the existing devolved Scottish Parliament as ‘a nuisance in 
certain circumstances’.  (Preston, 2008, 719).   This overlooks the possibility of a 
devolved Scotland as a political space within which policy experiments may take 
place which then could be a source of policy learning for the rest of the United 
Kingdom.   There are those who would argue that such experiments would not be 
possible without the Barnett Formula which, in their view, permits additional public 
expenditure in Scotland without raising taxes.  An alternative Scottish view is that the 
formula is not particularly generous, given Scotland’s special circumstances such as 
its remote areas, and does not compensate for revenue derived from Scottish oil.     
       Setting this controversy aside, a devolved Scotland may be able to take policy 
initiatives which could create a positive ‘California effect’ in the sense that California 
pioneers, for example, environmental policy initiatives that are then adopted by other 
states or at a federal level.   A current example based on my own current research 
would be animal welfare policy for livestock, particularly in relation to endemic 
diseases which have received more attention and stimulated some innovative policy 
responses in Scotland.    This is not entirely accidental, as one policy expert 
commented in interview: ‘In Scotland [we] tend to be forced together.  [There] does 
seem to be more contact because [we are] smaller.’3
        Devolution potentially brings gains for the UK polity as a whole, but Scottish 
independence might pose problems for England.   Preston sees it (2008, 724) as 
leading to ‘a more self-conscious English polity’ and that could well be the case, but 
what form would that self-consciousness take?    Attention often focuses on the loss 
of ‘a Westminster seat bank’ (Preston, 2008, 724) for Labour and certainly it would 
be easier for the Conservative Party to win elections without Scotland forming part of 
the United Kingdom.     
       My concern is, however, a broader one than electoral arithmetic and this is why I 
would never laugh at the prospect of Scottish independence.   Preston sees positive 
possibilities in terms of the emergence of an English nationalism that engaged in a 
serious reflection on the country’s location within global structures.  (Preston, 2008, 
722).      There is, of course, an English question which requires serious reflection.   In 
particular, ‘The unwillingness of the English to think about themselves separately 
from Britain, to see themselves as a British nation rather than the British nation is at 
the heart of the English Question in British politics.’  (Gamble, 2003, 3). The English 
nationalism that appropriates the flag of St. George and a vision of ‘Enger-land’ may 
display the very atavistic characteristics which Preston sees as absent in Scotland.   It 
can be xenophobic, inward looking and in denial of changed economic and political 
realties.    Scottish nationalism may be soft, but not its English counterpart.  The 
English need the Scots to save them from themselves. 
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